




Recolleclion as Dialectical Learning: Plato's Epislemic Response To
The Problem of the One and Many
By
Robert Glenn Gordon Seabright, B.A. (Hons.)
The problem of the one and many, epistemically, is how it is possible that we can know
sensible particulars. Connected to this problem are the inductive and deductive methods,
which Plato unsuccessfully employs in both his Laches and Meno as methodsfor
acquiring knowledge. These failures culminate in Meno's paradox, whichchallengesthe
possibilityofinquiryitself.Plato'sresponse,thedoctrineofrecollection, states that we
implicitly, or potentially, have knowledge, not ina manner that can be readily grasped,
but instead, through the activity ofdialectic, it is possible to make that knowledge explicit
or expressible. This method is demonstrated in the Meno when Socrates walks one of
Meno'sslaves through a geometrical proof. Through the aid of Socratesasanepistemic
midwife the boy is able to recollect the explicit knowledge that was absent at the
beginning of their discussion, thus avoiding the problems that arise from strict induction
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Plato's epistemology was greatly shaped by the intluenceofthe Presocratic
philosophers. My goal in this work will be to examine the connection betwecn the
Presocratics, specifically the philosophies of Heraclitus and Parmenides, and Plato's
theory of how we acquire knowledge. Through his use of the dialect ica1 method, an
activity of structured argument between two or more interlocutors,anditsconnectionto
the doctrine ofrecolleclion, which suggests that knowledge isamatterofbeingreminded
rather than of acquiring truths as though they can be passed on from one person to
another, Plato aims to address the problem of the one and the many, which he inherits
from the Presocratics. This problem can most simply be stated thus: how it is possible to
haveepistemicstability in the physical world given that, according to the senses, the
world is constantly shifting and changing? Further, according to reasonifthereisaunity
to being then it follows that being must be one undivided thing. In either case the problem
arises of how to account for particular things since, in the firstcasethere would be no
unity and therefore no objects, and in the second case there wouldbenoindividuationin
order for there to be separate objects. Epistemically, the problem oflhe one and the many
raises questions about how we reconcile these apparentcontradictionsinourexperience;
in other words, how it is possible that we perceive a stability to the world when our senses
seem to tell us that the world is constantly changing and shifting, and our reason should
tell us that being isa singuiarunified thing.' By examining the connection between the
problem of the one and the many and the problems of induction and deductionwecansee
both a direct reference in Plato's works to his predecessors and an attempt to reconcile the
inherentissueswithinthePresocratics'project.2 Havingaddressed these problems in his
earlywork,forinstance in the Laches, we can see a clear movement forward
epistemicallybyPlato'smiddleperiod,especiallyintheMeno.By tracing these problems
fromtheirsourceandthroughPlato'searlyperiodofwritinglintend to show the
development of his epistemie thought from the early to the middledialogues.
This work will be broken into four Chapters. The first will deal enti rely with the
PresocratieswherelintendtoexaminethethoughtofbothHeraclitusandParmenides.By
working closely with the surviving primary texts we can get a clear picture of the origins
of the problem of the one and the many. Further,thischapterwillmakeaconnection
betweentheproblemoftheoneandthemanyinHeraclitus'andParmenides'
philosophiesandtheproblemsofinductionanddeduction.lnmakingthisconnectionl
aim to limit myself to epistemic considerations and also provide a clear connection
between the Presocraticsand Plato's early writings in how he attempts to address the
problem of the one and the many through focusing on induction and deduction.lnmy
second Chapter I will examine the Laches as an example of these writingsand how Plato
deals with the problems addressed in Chapter One by using both induction and deduction
inan attempt to define courage. In the second halfofthis Chapter I will move to Plato's
middleperiod,representedbytheMeno,andexaminethefirstthird (up to section 80) of
the dialogue. In doing this we can see that, since the structure of both the Laches and
Meno is similar up until section 80 of the latter, Plato was still working with the same
epistemicconcems.ButwheretheLachesends,theMenocontinuesand in Chapter Three
I will address how and why this happens, namely because Meno challenges Socrates to
explain, given that induction and deduction seem to fail as methods for defining the
virtues, what method or starting point we have left to use in order todoso.Hischallenge,
referred to as Meno's paradox, poses the problem that, given someoneinquiringintothe
nature of virtues does not already know the nature of virtue, since if he did the inquiry
would be pointless, then it should be impossible for that person to ever recognize the
correct answer to his inquiry should he find it. Furthermore, without already possessing
knowledge about the answer to the inquiry the person should not evenbeabletobeginthe
inquiry atall,since he would not even know what to begin to look for. By showing that
Meno'sparadoxistheculminationoftheproblemsofinductionanddeduction(and
thereby the problem of the one and the many, since we will have seen their connection in
Chapter One) I will argue that Plato's solution to Meno'sparadox,namely his doctrine of
recollection, is hisepistemic answer to the problem of the one and the many. The doctrine
of recollection states that we both have and do not have the knowledge that we are
inquiring about, thereby making it possible to circumvent the problemsassociatedwith
Meno's paradox.3 lnstead of making the assumption that we already have the answers that
weseek,Platoarguesthatweshouldstartinquirybyembracingourignoranceand
through the dialectical method,an activity of question and answer between two or more
people, move toward knowledge with the aid of others. This is demonstrated when
Socrates works through a geometrical proof with one of Meno's slavesinaneffortto
express a model of how recollection works. In my fourth and final Chapter I will explain
how the dialectical method works as Plato's method for recollecting and how he aims to
move past the above discussed problems; by embracing our weakness ratherthanignoring
ilandinvitingotherstoparticipateinthalweaknessthroughexamining the slave boy
passageoflheMenoasamodelofrecoliection
Next, I will examine the dialectic method and discuss its benefits over other types
ofeducalion, especially implantation from without, suchastheabilityofdialectic
teaching to covey our ignorance of a subject as well as what we do know about it and how
it diminishes the risk of passing on a false opinion incorrectly as knowledge.' Finally, I
will argue that the dialectical method diffuses the problem ofoporia. Plato's dialogues
often end in bafflement and do not answer the question that they had 0 riginally set out to
discuss. By realizing that dialectic is a practice lhal each person must go through himself
we can see that Plato's dialogues were not meant to profess the natureofthevinuesbut
instead offer us a method which we can practice in order to understandtheirnature
through our own engagement with philosophy and with one another. Thus, with this work
I intend to explain how the doctrine of recollection, an activity made possiblethrough
engagement in the dialectical method, is Plato's answer to Meno's paradox, which is a
culminalion of the problems of induction and deduction. And,sincetheproblemsof
induction and deduction are closely related to the problem of the one and the many,
Plato's doctrine of recollection also provides an epistemic answerto this Presocratic
problem.
Chapter!
The Presocratic philosophers attempted to understand how there could be stability
in a world that constantly seemed to be changing. Given that the world constantly seems
to be shifting and unstable according to our senses, there must be sorne principle that
underlies things so that we can distinguish them as singular objectsandrecognizeone
object from another. In almost all instancesthePresocraticsattempted to unify a stability
of the world under a single principle. Thus, the Presocratics are generally known for their
universal statements that "all is" one principle. Heraclitus,forexample,isfamollsfor
stating that "all is flux" while Parmenides' proposition was that '~all is one". My focus
here will be to examine these two postulations closely by analyzing the texts of the two
one and the many.' This problem, directly connected to the philosophiesofboth
Heraclitus and Parmenides, is how it is possible to mediate between the many of
inductive methods and, as we shall see, a similar problem arises between these.
In his work On Nature Heraclitus writes: "upon those that step intothe same
rivers different and different waters flow [... ] They scatter and [... ]gather[... ]come
together and flow away [... ] approach and depart.'"What Heraclitus is saying here is
often stated simply as "you cannot merge yourself twice in the same stream.'" Although
the stream's name may remain constant between the time one steps into it and when he
subsequently steps into it again, the person's sensation of the stream will have
undoubtedlychangedandthus,basedontheperson'ssenses,iti s not the same stream as
it was before. For instance, as Heraclitus suggests, the waters OOW, move, and shift so
that if we were to rely only upon our senses we would not recognize the stream from onc
instance to the next9 The image of the motion and changing state 0 fthestreamisa
representation of Heraclitus' view of the sensible world as a whoIe and our sensation of it.
It is not just the stream that is constantly moving and shifting, but also all of sensible
reaiity is too. Thus, not only can a person never step into the same stream twice because
thestreamhaschanged,butalsobecausethepersonhaschangedaswell since he first
stepped into it. The person has become older, has expended energy,hasshiftedhis
position,andthereforehisperspective,andprcsumablynowhasawetfoot.Accordingto
this view, notoniy is it impossible to perceive the stream sincei t is shifting according to
our senses, but also it is impossible to perceive ourselves as any sort of unified singular
being. Our sensation of objects changes from moment to moment. For example, as we
move toward or away from an object, according to our senses it grows or shrinks. Yet, we
have an understanding that it is not the object that has changed, only our position relative
to it. This understanding provides us with a continuity that weare perceivingthesame
object even though it now appears different to our senses. However,recognizinga
particular by using only the senses is impossible on Heraclitus' viewsinceboththeobject
being observed and the person doing the observing are constantly changing according to
the observer's senses. '0 Thus, the problem is not simplythatthephysical world itself is
constantly changing but the observer is as well. What Heraclitus is expressing with this
example is that all things are in a constant state of flux, or, as itis often attributed to him,
"all is flux". 11
lfall things are constantly changing and shifting, as Heraclituscontends,thcnit
would be impossible to observe particulars using only the senses since, for example, if
youweretoseesomethingitwouldbeconstantlychangingandshifting giving you no
continuity ofa singular object. This is the many in Heraclitus' philosophy;thereappears
tobeaninfinitenumberofinstancesofeveryobject,evenofeverypart of every object,
thatcanbeexperiencedthroughthesenses.lfeverythingisinaconstantstateofflux,
then it is impossible to perceive any relation to or difference between one object and
anotherobject,orevenanycontinuityofanobjectwithitselffrom one instance to the
next. 12 For example, if I take a step toward the coffee cup on my desk, then, according to
my senses, it would appear to have grown during the time in which I have taken the step.
Furthermore, the cup would appear to have only one side, sinceusingonly my senses I
cannot observe that it has a back. If I were to step around the cup to viewitfroma
different angle, then the side I was originally viewing would seem to have disappeared.
Based soleiyon sensation how would I beabletodeterminethatthisobject is the same
one I W3S viewing a moment ago, or even that this object was notactuallyapartofthe
deskthatitrestedupon?DescartesobservesasimilarproblemintheSecondMeditation
of his Meditatiansan Fist Philasaphy with his wax exarnple:
Much like Heraclitus, Descartes observes that when using sensation aloneasameansof
examiningtheworldtherecanbenost'ability:usingthesensesalonecanneveryielda
continuity in the physical world. Thus there isa major problem withHeraclitus' theory: if
there can be no relation between objecls, even relation ofobjecls 1o themselves from one
12 Even referring to objects here presupposes some sortofconlinuityorstabilitythat
Heraclitus argues sensation could never provide.
13 Descartes, Rene.SelectedPhilasaphical Writings. Trans. Couingham,John.Stoothoff,
Robert. Murdoch, Dugald. ew York: Cambridge UP. 1988,84
moment in time to the next, then it would be impossible for us to observe objects at all.
Without any continuity in our sensation we would not be able toeven conceive of objects.
just swirling, ever-changing flux
Related to this problem is the problem of induction. The inductivemethod
attempts to start with a particular, or group of particulars, and indueeauniversaltruth
from them about all particulars that are similar to the object, orobj ects, of inquiry. The
inductive method, which is the basis of the modem scientific method, attempts to use
observationsaboutparticularstopredictsimilaraspectsinother, similar, particulars
Thus, if I notice that a piece of wood floats on water, and I test the theory out that wood
floats on water on a hundred other pieces of wood, finding that they float too, then I
might induce from my results that all pieces of wood float on water.
The problem of induction is best explained by means of an example. Karl Popper
explained in the 1930sthat individual statementsaboutparticulars cannot be used to
produce a universal claim about all particulars of the same set. 14 Heargued this theory by
referring to the "black swan problem." If a researcher using the inductivemethod
hypothesizedthat"allswansarewhite"andwentintothefieldtotest his theory, counting
hundreds upon hundreds of swans, all of which were white, then he would likely conclude
that his hypothesis was correct based on his observations. However there are indeed black
swans, which are native only to Australia, and thus if the researcher counted every white
swan on the planet outside of Australia, he would believe his theory to be sound, yet the
14 Popper, Karl R. The Logic ofScientific Discovery. 1952. London: Routledge, 1992
inclusion of one black swan would be enough to show his hypothesis to be incorrect. 15
Popper's example shows the limitation of the inductive method: it is impractical, and
perhaps even impossible, to count every swan on the planet, yet rnaking a universal claim
wilhoutdoing so is subject to falsification by inclusion into the set only one
counterexample, here the black swan. Thus, the problemofinductioncan be expressed as
the inability to make a universal claim about a set of particulars without having direct
experience of every member of that set. Of course this leads to the unsolvable problem of
identif)'ing evcry member ofa set. Clearly the scientists in theabove example did not
include the black swan in the set of swans when they made their hypothesis and only later
realized,upontheblackswan'sdiscovcrY,thatitbclongedtosuchaset.Whatweare
most interested with here is the problem of using particulars to make universal claims
about those particulars.
Heraclitus'flux,andsubsequentlytheproblemofthemany,isrelated to the
problem of induction were it pushed to an absolute extreme. The problemofinduction
addresses taking the finite experience ofa set of particulars and from that experience
making a claim about all similar particulars without experiencing them all individually as
well. Heraclitus' problem is in taking the infinite sensations of everchanging,shifting
flux and recognizing from it singular objects. In both instancesthere is an attempted
move from a plurality. With regard to induction, a plurality ofexperiencesofasetof
objects and with regard to Heraclitus' philosophy. a plurality of sensations of motion and
flux, toa singularity. in induction the attempted move istowardasingularclaimabouta
set of objects and in Heraclitus' philosophy the attempted move is toward an experience
of asingular object, in other words a particular. Both the inductive method and the many
in Heraclitus' philosophy rely on sense data to attempt to move from apluralitytoa
singularity, and it is in that similarity that a problem arises for both. For Heraclitus,
sensation of the motion, change, and flux will never give me anexperienceofasingular
object because based solely on my sensation I canonlyexperiencemotion,change,and
flux,andbasedonthisexperiencethereisnosingularobject.lnduction,frommysense
data about a particular object, or set of objects, will never fully justify a universal claim
about that entire set of objects because my experience is limited and I cannot experience
all of the objects of that set. Of course, this is a step beyond Heracli tus'morefundamental
problem since for there to be induction there first has to be some observable object to
begin with. The connection is that both Heraclitus' theory and theinductivemethodare
attempts to move from a plurality to a singularity, a many to a one: with induction a
plurality of observations aboutasetofobjectstoagcncral claimaboutthatsetofobjects,
and with Heraclitus's philosophy a plurality of experiences of motion, change and flux to
a singular object. While Heraclitus attempts to move toward a unity from a plurality,
Parmenides' attempted move is just the opposite, a move from a unity toaplurality.
Parmenides' method begins with onc principle, Being, and attempts to see what
logically follows. In denying sensation he relies on reason to dictate what must follow
given the ideological hypothesis that Being is one unified prineiple.At291 of his work
titled On Nailire he proposes a choice between what he says are the only two possible
ways of enquiry, "that [it] is and that it is impossible for [it] notto be," which he calls the
pathofpersuasion(anaspectoftruth)and"that[it]isnotandthat it is needful that [it]
not be," which he says is an indiscernible task, for it would be impossible to know what is
not. 16 It is from this passage that we can derive Parmenides' c!aimthat it is irrational to
speak about nothing, since in speaking about nothing we are attributing,orpredicating,
something to a non-existent thing. 17 Thus, Pannenides, inabandoning the second way of
knowing, affinns the first "that [it] is and that it is impossible for [it] not to be." From this
follows the proposition that ifit, Being, is and ifit cannot not-bethenilmusthavealways
been and must always be. Forifit is and cannot not-be then therecould be no time, either
inpastorfuture,thatitdoesnotexist,thus,itiseternaI.Pannen ides here is relying on the
Principle of Sufficient Reason, that all things have a cause, since "he assumes that
anything which comes to be must contain within it some principle of development
sufficient to explain its generation. But if something does not exist, how can it contain
any such principle?,,18 In other words, ifatone time Being did not exist, then it would be
impossible for there to exist any principle to bring Being into existcocc.
at least two things so that they could be contrasted with one another.lnothcrwords,if
there were two things then there would have to be some difference that could distinguish
one from the other. Finally he asserts that Being is unchanging and perfect"for it is not
deficient-ifit were it would be deficient in everything.,,20 This final point follows the
same basic principle as the one before it. For there to be deficiency there would have to
be something that Being is lacking, and if there is somethingotherthanBeing,whatever
lhingthatBeingislacking,thenthereareatleasttwoprincipleS,whichParmenides
clearly denies.
While the problem with Heraclitus' theory is that given absolute Ilux it would be
impossible for particular objects 10 exist, Pannenides' problem isjust the opposite,
although the result is the very same.21 TheissuewithParmenides'theory is this: if there
is only one principle, Being, and this principle is continUQllS andinseparable,then
particulars could not exist. For there to be particulars there wouldhavetobediffercnce,
which Parmenides maintains there is not, and separate divided objects that were distinct
dislinctionbetweenknowerandknown,subjectandobject.Sincelheoneisperfect,
atemporal and unchanging, and in order 10 know it the knowerwould have to be it, since
il is undivided, lhen the knower would have to also be perfect, atemporaI and unchanging,
which would make that person Being itself.
It is also possible 10 approach this problem in a difTerent way. We perceive,
undcrstand,and know things based on differencc, both ditTerence in separate objects,
such as thc difTerence between knower and known,anddifferencc within the object itself,
between the whole and its parts. For example, I can recognize a bike as a human powered
mode of transport and do so through recognizing its difference from its surroundings. If
thiswerenotpossible,thebikcwouldappearnodifTerentfromtheroadthatitstoodon
Furthcrmorc, I recognize the bikeasa singular object but understandthatitcomprises
separatepartsthatwhencombinedtogethcrinacertainwayconstitutemyideaof"bike":
wheels, handlebars, a seat, and so forth. Without lheability to discern lhese separale paris
from one another, my ability to recognize a bike would not be possible. Thus, we havelhe
problemoflheone:ifBeingisoneunifiedthing,thenisilimpossibleforlheretobe
difTerence, and thereby impossible for lhere 10 be particularobjecls.Thus,Parnlenides
claims that sensation is not a reliable source for the acquisition ofknowledge,sinccthcrc
could not be particular things given his logical dcduction from the 0 nC,and the senses and
our experience indicate that there are particulars.22 As Edward Hussypointsout,"Sense-
perception, [according to Parmenides], even when in factveridicaI, presumably does not
yield knowledge because of the possibility of deception. What it reveals, not being part of
the core of reality, is nonessential and not demonstrable by reasoning.,,23
As we have seen, the problem of the one isa problem ofpluralizingordividinga
singular into particulars. This problem is closely related to the problemofdeduction,
which also attempts to divide a singular principle or apply a singularprincipletoa
plurality of instances. Deduction is strictly the opposite of induction.Whileinduction
begins with a set of particulars and attempts to make a universal claim about them based
on their similarities, deduction begins with a universal claim and attempts to apply that
claim to a set of particulars. The deductive method begins withageneralaxiom, such as
all men are mortal, then asserts one or more propositions that relate to that axiom, such as
Socrates is a man, in order to deduce a conclusion that should logically follow: Socrates is
mortal. The purpose of this method is to move from a universal claim about all men,
given the above exampie, to a truth about a particular instance, Socrates'mortality.Given
that Socrates is a member of the set of all men and a property of all members of that set is
mortality, it follows that Socrates must also have that property.
With regard to definition, deduction attempts to assert a general claim about a
subject so that particular instances can fall under that definition. Thus, we start with one
general claim with the purpose of proving it by showing that exampies of the definition
fall under it. Forexarnple, ifjustice is defined as "to tell the truth and return what one has
received"asitis in Book I of Repub/ic, then the definition standsor falls on the examples
that are presented in relation to it, that is, what can be deduced from it.24 The problem
with deduction in the Socratic dialogues is that whengivingageneraldefinitionitis
possible that contradictory examples can fall under that definition. Thus, with reference to
the above, it is possible to contradict the definition by offering an example that falls under
it,butconflictswithwhatthedefinitionistryingtodefine.Withregard to the definition
ofjusticeproposedinBookloftheRepublic,returningwhatonehasreceived,the
example that falls under the definition while refuting its claim is "this return ofa deposit
to anyone whatsoever even ifheasks for it back when not in his rightmind,,,2S For
example, suppose a neighbor had loanedyouaweapon foruseonahuntingtrip.Thenext
day, af'ter overhearing a heated argument between the neighbor andhiswifewhereinhe
threatened to do her harm, the man knocks on your door asking for his weapon back
Clearly, it would be unjust to return the man's weapon since he had the intent to use it to
harm his wife. However, while it is recognized that it is not just to return the weapon, the
proposed definition states that you should. Thus,retuming what 0 ne has received is not
justice, since it is too broad: it allows concepts 10 fall under it lhat contradict what it is
attempling to define. In attempting to particularize the general concept a contradiction
Both the deductive method and the problem of the one in Parmenides 'philosophy
are problems of attempting to move from one principle to more than onc thing. In the case
ofPannenides'philosophyhebeginswithoneprinciple,Being,and given that one
principle attempts to see what logically follows from it. The problem that occurs is that
24Plato,Republic,33ld.
"lbid.,33Ie.
given Being, there could not possibly be any division, since individing being there would
have to be something other than Being, something separate and outside of Being. Given
this proposed singularity, particular things could not exist sinee, if there were no
difference, there would be nothing to distinguish one thing from another.Theproblemof
deduction isasimilarone in that it arises out of the attempt topluralizeoneprinciple,
which is taken as a starting point, and apply that principle to all membersofaset.Given
the above example from the Republic the principle would be justice defined as telling the
truth and retumingwhat is owed and the application would be to all actsofjustice.The
problem arises from the possibility of having a member of the set thatcontradictsthe
generalclaimitself,hereretumingaweapontoanindividualthat will use it unjustly.
Thus,inbothcases,theproblemoftheoneinParmenides'philosophyand with the
problem of deduction, there isan issue with the division ofa subject that creates a
contradiction. WithParmenides' one the division of the one itself is a contradiction, since
individingtheonetherewouldbemorethanonething,whichParmenides clearly denies.
Whereas, in the case of deduction this contradiction occurs in having a particular fall
under the definition proposed that contradicts that verydefinition.
While Heraclitllsand Pannenidesapproach the world from opposingdirections,
Heraclitus from absolute flux and Parmenides from absolute unity, they end up with the
same problem: neither philosopher's theory can adequatelyexpress the existence of, and
therefore our knowledge of, sensible particulars. Thus, weare presented with the problem
of the one and many: how it is possible to reconcile these two different theories inan
effort to mediate between them? Epistemically the problem is tied to the problems of
induction, with regard to Heraclitus' (lux, and to deduction, with Parmenides' one. It
seems that induction can never properly lead toa universal claim, whereas deduction can
never properly derive a singular particular thing. Plato was very interestedinthese
problems and attempted to find a solution to them. In examining them here we have set
up the major issues that will dominate his epistemic philosophy, as we will see with his
treatment of them in the Laches and in the beginningoflheMena, theirculminationin
Meno's paradox and Plato's response with the doclrineofrecollection.
Chapter 2
In Chapter One we examined the Presocratic philosophers, speci ficallyl-leraclitus
and Parmenides. From their philosophies we were introduced to the problemoftheone
and the many, the problem of mediating between the absolute flux 0 fl-leraclitusandthe
absolute unity of Parmenides in order to account for particulars.FurthemlOre,wemade
the connection between the problem of the one and the many and the problemsof
deduction and induction. Theepistemic issues raised in Plato's Laches and MenD can be
viewed asa response to the problem of the one and the many and thus, giventhe
connections we saw in Chapter One, episternically, these dialogues address the inductive
anddeductivemethods.26 In his earlier dialogues Plato has hischaracterspropose
definitions of virtues inan effort to define them. However,thedefinitions are derived
either inductively or deductively, as we shall soon see when we examine the Laches, and
thus they address the same problems we examined in Chapter One. This Chapter will
focus on the transition of these key philosophical issues from the Presocraticperiodinto
Plato's philosophy. By focusing on the Laches and the first third 0 ftheMeno.lwill
highlight the conncctions between the Presocraticsand Plato' sepistemology and show
that the problem of the one and the many, as well as the problems of inductionand
deduction, are dominant issues which he must deal with. By then showing the further
development of his thought in the latter sections of the Meno,whichi will discuss in
Chapter Three, I will examine Plato's progress in dealing with these issues from the early
to middle period of his writing.
Plato's goal epistemically in the dialogues can be seen as an attempttomediate
between the universal, the forms, and their particular instantiations,inordertoarriveata
proper definition of the subject of inquiry. Plato's forms are universals in which all things
partake. As Heinamen explains: "the forms can only be apprehended by reason, and it
will be by thinking about them, by having them in our mental view, that we will acquire
knowledge of them, not by tumingto the sensibles that only confusinglyrellectthe
natures we wish to know.,,27 Plato argues that the forms are not fully accessible to us in
anyeffablemannersinceformsarebeyondlinguisticordemonstrativeexpression. Yet,if
we know the form of something we should be able to define that thing which, as we shall
soon see in the Laches, we are not always able to do. In his Seventh Lefler Plato explains:
Plato conlinues llsing a circle as an example. Its name is,ofcQurse,circle,itsdescription.
a geometrical figure lhat has all pointsofitscircumferenceequidistant from a center
point, and its image, which eQuid be drawn or erased. The fOUfthcl ass,knowledge,differs
from the first three in that it isa purely mental class whereas the priorthreeareall
manifestations, either linguistically, in the case of name and description, or physically I in
the case of the image. While Plato maintains that the fourthclass is closest to the actual
circle, the fifth class of objects, namely the forms, it is still separate from this class. What
is significant here is that each class moves farther away from class 5, the actual circlc, and
as they move farther away from the actual circle the classes become more unstable. Thus,
Thus, changing any of the objects in these categories would have no impact on the true
nature of the circle (it would still contain all thepropertiesof"ci rcleness").Thus,to
retum to my previous point that forms are noteffable, we can clearly seethatsince
discursive language is a different category altogether from the fonns,toattempt to render
the form qua form into language is impossible since it would put the form into a different
category where itwouldceasetobea form
However, while the forms are not exhausted in any discursive sense we do have
some understanding of them, the fourth class on the above model,andthus do have at
least some access 10 them. This access allows us to recognize instancesofthevirtucs
making it possible to, for example, point to a courageous act and distillguish it from an act
of cowardice. This access to the forms, our ability to recognizeacourageousactfromone
of cowardness I will refer to as implicit knowledge. Since this implicit knowledge is of
the fifth class of objects it is inexpressible, for the reasons discussed above, either
linguistically or by citing concrete examples. However, Plato' saimisexactlythat,tobe
able to give a proper definition of the true nature of the virtues, that is, to express them
linguistically. While the fonn of something such as courage is out of the reach of
29/bid.,342b.Emphasisadded
someone trying to discem its nature in a discursive manner, in away that he can
linguistically or express in practice, Plato hopes to show that sorne definition of courage
may be possible beyond simply pointing to specific examplesofcourageousactswithout
being able to express why they are courageous acts. Thistypeofknowledge I will refer to
as explicit knowledge: knowledge that is expressible either through language or inaction.
As we shall see, the problem becomes settling on a definition thatisbroad enough to
encompass all courageous acts while narrow enough as to exclude non-courageousones
Thus, the type of definition Plato seeks isadeterminationbetween the particular instances
and the inexpressible form of the object of inquiry
Picture Plato's line analogy. At the top we have the one or the Good, not fully
knowable in any discursive manner]O Slightly below this are the other forms, which arc
also not fully expressible linguistically. On thebotlom we have particularinstantiations
such as Socrates' courageous actions in Delium as described by Laches."Theformof
courage is not accessible to us in a manner that we can express linguistically,sinceto
communicate the form of courage would be to express perfectly everythingabout
courage. On the other hand Socrates' actions in Delium also do not provide an adequate
measure of the nature of courage since there could be othercourageous actions that differ
from this particular instance, circumstantially. The definition that Plato is attempting to
find would bea mediation between the universal fonnsand the particularactions so that
the definition would be both broad enough to encompass all courageous acts yet narrow
enough to exclude non-courageous ones. Furthermore, since the definitionisamediation
JO Plato, Repliblic,509d.
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between universal and particular any particular instance of the definition should be able to
be deduced from it, and the definition should be able to be induced from any particular
that falls under it. Thus, a true definition of courage should be able to be induced from
any particular example of courage, while any particular example 0 fcourageshouldbe
The Laches begins with a discussion of the importance ofeducatingtheyouthof
Athens. Two Athenian men, Lysimachus and Melesias, lament that their sons are failing
to live up to the virtuous lives lead by their ancestors.J2 The failure of the youth of Athens
to live up to their ancestors and their generally livingun-virtuo llS lives are problems that
Plato is attempting to fixbydetennining first, what it is that makes a good citizen, and
second,ifitispossibletoteachthistoothers.Ofcourse,thesecondgoal here is
contingent on the first, as one cannot teach what one does not know;furthermore,itis
unclearwhetherthevirtuesarethingsthatcanbetaughtatall.ltisthis goal that Plato is
setting out to accomplish in the Laches: to define the nature of courage,andtodetennine
ifit is something that can be taught. In order to establish adefini tion ofcQurage, the
dialogues' inter!ocutors attempt to use both the inductive and deductivemethods.ln
havinghischaractersengageinductivelyanddeductivelywesee Plato engaging with the
problems of deduction and induction and through them engaging with the problem of the
one and the many.
As his first 3ttempt 3t a definition of courage, Laches argues, "he is a man who is
courageous who does not run away, but remains at his post and fights against the
enemy."JJ On the surface this indeed may seem to be the definition of courage, but
through a subsequent discussion itis found that this definition istoo particular to be
courage itself. We certainly would not want to claim here that what Laches has proposed
is notcQurageous, 8S staying at one's designatcd post in battle andfightinganenemyis
courageous but it, as a definition, does not constitute courage asawhole.34 Socrates
establishes this point by describing the tactics ofa company of cavalry, or other military
force that does not meet its opponent head on. In order to be effective, cavalry use hit and
run tactics by which they charge their opponent, attacking in the process.and then retreat
or simply pass through the opposing force until they are out oftheirrange, thus
preventing an opportunity for a cQunterattack. Given Laches' definition, these soldiers
would not be considered courageous since they are not stayingata designated post and
fighting, but rather are fighting while constantly on the move. Ofcourse, the problem this
example poses to Laches' definition isthatwewDuldcertainly W3nt to call the cavalry
courageous in battle even while they use their hit and run tactics. Thus,Laches'deftnition
seemsunfittoconstitutecourageasawholesinceitistooparticular;thatis,thereare
courageous acts that fall outside of the proposed definition. Furthermore, it should be
and that is not possible with Laches' definition. Forinstance,i tisnotpossibletodeduce
the courage displayed by cavalry from it. What I mean by this is that Socrates is
attempting to achieve is a definition of courage that is general enDugh that it does not
exclude any particular instances of courageous acls. Asucessful definitionofcQurage
shouIdbegeneralenoughthataJIcourageousactsfalIunderitsothat the definition could
be induced from any one of them and any of the acts could be deduced from the
In attempting to explain what type of definition he is looking for,Socrates
provides the example of quickness. He says that quickness is a charactcristic that can be
attributedtoarms,legs,voice,mouthandmind.Continuing,Socrates says "suppose that I
were to be asked by someone. What is that common quality, Socrates, which, in all these
activities, you call quickness? I should say that the quality which accomplishes much in
little time-whether in running, speaking, or in any other sort ofaction.,,35 Here Socrates
provides an example of the type of definition that he is looking for. Given this definition
it would be possible to deduce all particular instances ofquicknessandfromeach
instance it would be possible to induce this definition. However,itshouldbenotedhere
that it is also possible that this is nota perfect definition ofquicknessandthatPIatois
expressing here what happens when we do not challenge a given defin itionofaconcept
While this definition of quickness seemssound,sodid the first definition given of
courage at the beginning of the dialogue, and had that definition simply been accepted
then we would not have moved forward philosophicaIIy at all. The interesting aspect of
this passage is that while the rest of the dialogue fails to define courage, Socrates has little
"lbid.,Ina.
trouble defining quickness to provide an example of the type ofanswerhe is looking for;
he even manages to do so with without use of the dialectical method, which eventually
Plato offers as the best method ofacquiring truth. What method then does Socrates use to
acquire this knowledge? Where did it come from and, perhaps most importantly, what is
it about the nature of quickness that makes it so easy to define whi Ie the nature of courage
is so elusive? I by no means have the answers to these questions, andraisethembecause
of their importance regarding defining the virtues rather than because I know some
solution to the problems they propose. However, I perhaps can offersomesuggestions.lt
would seem that the most profound difference between quickness and courage would be
that courage isa virtue while quickness is a techne, a craft or ski lLPerhapsthenthefact
that courage isa virtue, which Plato maintains is not teachable in the same manncrasa
technelikequickness,iswhatmakesitsodifficulttodefine.However,evenifthe
difference between courage and quickness is one of virtue or techne,itisstillratherodd
that Socrates so quickly grasps the definition of quickness given that he proclaims in the
"Plato,Apology,23b
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anempling to give a broader definition of courage than his first, one that covers all
instances of courage, Laches has provided one that is too general or universal. In order 10
illustrate this point Socrates inquires about foolish endurance and asks if this type of
endurance would be considered courageous. Take, as an examplc, a malic ioustyrantwho,
already having secured a city that is importam strategically for his militarycampaign,
continues to attack the remaining forces of the city. Suppose theeity surrenders to the
tyrant knowing that it is beaten and more fighting will only cause moreharrn to its
citizens. If the tyrant continues to bombard the city, sieging it fordaysorevenweeksand
showing no mercy or tiredness, he would indeed be said to be showing endurance, yet
harassing an already defeated city could hardly be considered courageous.Thus, Laches'
general definition has allowed non-courageous acts to fall underitandthereforecannot
be considered to be the true nature of courage. In other words, weareabletodeduce
things from this definition that are not courageous, and thus itcannotbeatruedefinition
of courage itself.
With Laches' first definition we see the problem of induction, hisdefinitionistoo
narrow in scope and therefore there are particular instances of couragethatfalloutsideof
it. This definition could not be induced from every particularinstanceofcouragebecause
it is not general enough to encompass all instances, while every instance of courage could
not be deduced from it for the same reason. Alternatively, Laches' seconddefinition
demonstrates the problem of deduction. It is too general to be the definitionofcourageas
lhereare non-courageous things that could possibly fall underit.This definition fails
because it can be induced from a non-courageous aCl or because a non-courageousact
could be deduced from it, thereby creating a contradiction
Nicias steps in at this point to give his own definition, which stems from the
premise that courage is a virtue and that virtues can be taught. J8 1fthis is the case then
courage must beakindofknowlcdge, specifically "knowledge of that whichinspiresfear
orconfidenceinwar,orananything."J9Socrates'responsetothis definition is
multifaceted. First, if courage is knowledge of fear and conftdence,then it is a science,
and science, he maintains, should provide knowledge of the past, present, and future of its
subject. For example, the knowledge that Venus is the morning star is, was, and always
will be true. There was certainly a point when people did not specifically know this
information, but it still holds that when a person pointed to the brightest star in the
morning he was pointing to the planet Venus. Furthermore, as long as linguistic
constructions stay constant, at any time in the future if someone points to the star that is
referred to as "the morning star" then he will be pointing to the planet Venus'o However,
courage, as the scienceoflhe inspiration of fear and confidence,would only extend to the
future, since what is feared or not feared is something that we are yet to face. As Socrates
explains, "then courage is a science which isconcemed not only with the fearful an
hopeful,fortheyare future only. Courage, like other sciences, is concerned not only with
good and evil of the future, of the past and present, and of anytime.,,41 Thus,thedefinition
ofcourageasasciencecannotholdunlesswedeemcouragetobeanincompletescience,
only pertaining to one aspect, the future, and not to the pastor present. On the other hand,
if courage is the knowledge of the nature of the whole of fear and confide nee, the past,
present and future of fear and confidence, then weare facedwiththe opposite problem. If
fear and confidence are goods or evils, as Socrates maintains they are, then the science of
courage, "is not only the knowledge of the hopeful and the fearful , but seems to include
nearly every good and evil without reference to time" making the de finitionnolonger
courage but virtue itseIf4 ' While it should be noted that Socrates is happier with Nicias'
definition than Laches', because it proposes that courage is a type of knowledge (a detail
that Socrates himself attributes to courage), it is stilI either too particular, if courage is an
incomplcte science. or tOQ universal if it is a complete science, and thus virtue and not
nature of courage. Neither deduction nor induction can establish the proper definition of
courage, and thus weare faced with the problem of where to begin our philosophical
search for truth. While the Laches establishes this problem and then ends in aporia, with
the characters ironically returning to school to educate themselvesinlightofadiscussion
abouthowbesttoeducatetheyouth,PlatoaltemptsintheMenotomove past this state
and provide an answer to how it is possible that we can attain knowledge.
During the discussion in the Laches Socrates explains that he"would not have us
begin [... ] with inquiring about the whole of virtue, for that may be more than we can
accomplish.,,44 This isan interesting claim considering that a discussion about the nature
of the whole of virtue is precisely the subject of the Meno. Much Iike the Laches, the
Meno begins with the question of whether virtue can be taughl.45 Instead of focusing on
one aspect of virtue, as Plato does in the Laches, here he inquires into the nature of virtue
asawhole.AlsoresemblingthestructureoftheLachesisthatthediscussionintheMeno
tumsfirsttotheverynatureofthesubjectinquestioninorderforittobeestablishedifit
can be taught or not. This continues to beakey point for Plato as it is in understanding
the nature of something that we can determine whether it is teachable. Furthermore, as we
saw with the beginning of the Laches, in order to teach something it must first be known
to the teacher46 Thus, the Meno begins with the same structure and goal of the Laches: to
define, either inductively or deductively, the virtues and then discover if they are the
teachable"
Meno begins by giving various definitions of what he believes to be vi rtues.ltis
virtuous for a man to govern the state well, for a woman to govern the house well, and so
forth. Meno, thinking that he already knows the nature of virtue, givesspecificexarnples
of virtuous acts which set the discussion upto move forward inductively.48 However,
although he has given specific examples of what he believes to be virtuousacts, he has
not provided a definition of the nature of virtue itself. Socrates isquick to point out this
[act and compares Meno's "swarm of virtues" to a swann of bees, saying,
By likcningMcno'smany specific inslancesofvirtueto bees, Socrates asks whal it is that
makes all the individual bees such that one can recognize them all both as individuals and
also all asthesarnelhing; likewise, he asks Meno for a definition of virtue that will be
commontoallofhisspecificexamplesofvirtuousacts.lnresponsetothis Meno refines
his definition to be that virtue is "the capacity to govern men."so 1-1owever,thisdefinition
proves to be too particu)arto be virtue, as it is possible to be virtuous without governing
men, say in the case ofa slave being virtuous. Socrates replies to Meno'svarious
suggestions saying that they have "discovered a number of virtueswhen we were looking
for only one. This single virtue, which permeates each of them, we cannotfind."sI He
then asks what makes shape able to describe both straight and curved figures: howisit
possible that one concept can contain contrary particulars? Againwe see the problem of
induction played out here. To follow Socrates' own analogy ofgeometry,neithera
particularcirclenoraparticularsquareencompassesalloftheterm "shape" since there
are other shapes, triangles, for example, or even other example5 of the same figures
(differentsizedsquaresandcircles)thatarealsoshapes.WhiIe it is possible to induce the
term shape from a particular instance ofa square or circle, neither is moreofa shape than
the other since both could be deduced from the term shape. What Socrates is suggesting
Meno is doing here is giving him particular squares or circles when he is actually looking
for the term shapeasa whole. Just as the term shape is not exhausted by any one specific
figure, the whole of the nature of virtue is not contained in any oneparticular instance of
avirtuousact. 52 Here we see the same issue as the one involved in Laches' first
definition: there are virtuous acts that fall outside of the proposed definition, and it should
be possible to deduce any particular instance of virtue from a truedefinition and that is
not possible with Meno'sdefinition
In light of this discussion Menooffersanewdefinitionofvirtue: the "desiring of
fine things and being able to acquire them."" Here, Meno, in light of his failure to name
virtueusingtheinductivemethod,byextrapolatingfromhisspecificdefinitionstoa
general one, attempts to define virtue deductively. However,indoing this, as we have
seenpreviouslywithLaches'secondattemptandthatofNicias,Menoprovidesa
definition that is too universal. Socrates explains that all men desire good things. Even
those who are deemed by others to want evil are themselves attempting to acquire what
they perceive as good. This is one formulation of Plato's ethica1claim that no one
willingly desires evil, or performs evil deeds, and doing such is simply to mistake the bad
for the good.54 Thus, virtue cannot be the desire for good things, sinceallmendesirethe
good (or at least their own conception of the good), and ifdesiring the good makes one
virtuous, then all men would be virtuous, and it seems that they arenot.55 Since the desire
for the good is shown to be too broad to be virtue, Meno narrows hisde finition to refine
this claim and only includes the second part of his original defini tion:theabilityto
acquire good things. Meno is here is providing us with a prime example of the deductive
method in action. His definition wastoogeneral,and thus he removesthepartsofthe
definition that do not work, shaving it down until its scope narrows enough to include all
of virtue, and exc!udes other things, but not too narrow that itexcludes some aspects of
virtue. Unfortunately for Meno, his refined definition does just that. The ability to acquire
good things is far too narrow to be the definition of virtue since itshould be possible to be
a virtuous person while not being able to acquire good things for oneself. Take, for
example, missionaries who work to help others yet live with little wealth of their own.
While we would likely call these people virtuous, giventheirefforts to aid others, their
lackofwealthwouldhindertheirabilitytoacquiregoodthingsfor themselves.
Alternatively, a wealthy criminal might be able to acquire many good things for himself
but does so by stealing from others. We certainly would not want to call this person
virtuous even though under Meno's proposed definition he would bevirtuous.Thus, it is
clear that Meno has not defined virtue by using either induction or deduction spurring
Plato to provide his own attempt at a so!ution to the issue of where to begin our search for
knowledge.
Both the Laches and the Meno share a very similar structure up until about section
79c of the latter dialogue where it takes a major shift indirection and focus. Both start
with the question of our ability to define virtue, orat least a virtue in the Laches, in an
attempt to understand its nature and determine ifit is the sortofthing that can be taught.
While both dialogues focus on the issue of definition, it isimportant to note that the
reason that Socrates and his companions are trying to define these things is related to the
education, the teachability,ofthem; is virtue something that canbetaughtandpassedon
from one person to the next?s6This isa huge issue for Plato forreasonsdiscussedabove,
and it plays a major role in bothdiaiogues. In looking into the nature of the definition of
virtue, both dialogues use both the inductive and deductive methods in an attempt to find
an answer. Ultimately, both dialogues show the failures of these methodstodefinethe
dialogues are in a state of aporia.57
WhereChapterOnediscussedtheproblemofoneandmanyasitisexpressed
through the philosophies of Heraclitus and Parmenides, inthissecond Chapter I sketched
the way in which Plato demonstrates this problem in his works, particularly the Laches
andthebeginningoftheMeno.lndrawingtheconnectionsbetween the problem of the
many and the problem of induction and the problem of the one and the problemof
deduction, a connection can be made,epistemically, between these Presocratic issues and
Plato's attempt to define the virtues. In examining these two dialogues we get a clearer
picture of how Plato is concerned with the same issues that we discussedinChapterOne.
In attempting to define the virtues, starting with a particularinstanceofa virtue and using
the inductive method in order to attempt to universalizc thatparticularalwaysyieldsa
definition that is too narrow in scope, that is it does not fully account for all instances of
the virtue. Alternatively, beginning with a universal claim and then attempting to deduce
the proper definition of the virtue from it always yields a definition that is too broad, one
thatallowscontrarydefinitionstofallunderit.lneithercase,aswehave seen with the
LachesandsofarwiththeMeno,neitherinductionordeductionare reliable methods to
by what means would itbe possible to begin inquiry? This is precisely the question that
MenowillproposetoSocratesinthenextsectionofthedialoguebearinghisname.ltis
in Plato's response to thischallengc,the doctrine ofrecollection,that we get his proposed
solution to moving past the problems of induction and deduction and therefore, since they
are connected, as we saw in Chapter One, the problem of the one and the many.
Chapter 3
As with the Laches, the beginning of the Meno shows that both induetionand
deductionfailasmethodsfordefiningthenatureofthevirtues.Byconcerninghimself
with the inherent problems of induction and deduction Plato isaIso addressing the
Presocratic problem of the one and the many. Inmy first two Chaptersldiscussedthe
problemoftheoneandthemanyinHeraclitusandParmenides'phiiosophies and traced
the connection between it and the problems of the inductive and deductivemethods
through Plato's Laches and the beginning of the Meno. Where these methods are shown
to fail,eitherby providing definitions that are too narrow in scope,inthecaseof
induction, or too board in scope, in the case of deduction, we are now left with the
problem of how to properly begin inquiry. With this problem in mind I will begin this
Chapter by examining the challenge of this type of inquiry with Meno's paradox, where
he aims to show that inquiry itself is either pointless Of unnecessary.Byarguingthat
Meno's paradox is the culmination of the problems discussed in Chapter Two, I will show
and the many.
not push Socrates, and themselves, for further progress, Meno's frustration with Socrates
boils over and the dialogue continues. Afterthcir inquiry into the nature of virtue arrives
at a point of failure, Menocalls Socrates a sting ray, a creature that paralyzes its prey by
stingingiLI usethetennfrustration in referring to how Menolikelyfeelshereas,in
agreement with Scott, I believe that, "aside from the fact that he feels himself at a
complete impasse, Meno may also feel that he once had something of value to say about
virtue (80b), which has now been destroyed."" Meno'sanalogy here is to compare the
sting ray's ability to paralyze its prey physically to Socrates' ability to paralyze
whomever he is speaking with mentally by showing them their ignorance about a subject
they had thought they had understood. Socrates replies, "as for myself, if the sting ray
paralyzes others only through being paralyzed itself, then the comparison is just, but not
otherwise. 1tisn'tthat, in knowing the answers myself, I perplex other people. The truth
isratherlinfectthemwiththesameperplexitylfeelmyself.""Socrates is not proposing
that he understands the nature of virtue whereas Meno is ignorantand in fact has even
gone so far as to claim that he knows nothing at all. 60 Instead Socratcsisclaimingto
impart the same ignorance upon his companion that he himself feels; in attempting to see
ifhiscompanionhasknowledgeofthevirtuesSocratesshowshimthat he is actually
ignorant.6\
It is clear here that Meno is fed up with the faetthathisdiscussionwithSocrates
is going nowhere and instead of revealing answers SocrateshasmadeMenorealizethat
he knows less than he thought he did. He demands some answers from Socrates and even
goes so far as to say that ifhe"behaved like thisasa foreigner in another country, [he]
would be most likely be arrested as a wizard.,,6'This is, perhaps, an ironic passage by
Plato,asSocratesisarrestedinAthens,notasaforeignerbutas a citizen fordoing
exactly what he is doing at this very point of the dialogue, that is, showing people who
think they know something that they indeed do not6 ' We must remember that Meno is a
well-known member of society with powerful friends; what Socrates is doing here,
namely making Meno seem like a fool, is very dangerous.64 Socrates, of course, knows
this and he even argues that the stakes could not be higher when dealing with philosophy
and the acquisition ofknowledge.6s Since he isconcemed withethies, Socrates believes
that it is imperative that we understand the nature of the virtues, especially ifvirtue is the
typeofthingthatcanbetaught.66 Thisispivotalsince,inunderstanding the nature of
virtue and the method by which it can be taught, Athens can educate its youth to be
virtuous citizens. Further, knowing the nature of virtue allows the citizens of the city of
Athenstoactvirtuouslyandnotrnistakeanon-virtuousactforavirtuousone.For
example, if the courts of Athens are to function properly, then an understandingofjustice
is paramount. Likewise, the army should understand the natureofcourage so that itcan
distinguish courageous acts from non-courageous ones as well asteach its soldiers to be
courageous.6'However,the problem that has arisen from looking at both the Laches and
the Meno is how such knowledge is acquired. As both dialogues have shown, induction
and deduction fail as methods for defining virtue, and thus it seems that there is no proper
starting point to begin inquiry. Frustrated,andlikelyembarrassed that he has been shown
not to know what he believed that he did know, Meno challenges Socrates with the
following paradox:
Thus, if the nature of virtue is unknown, as it clearly is to Socratesand Menoat this point
in the dialogue, then it seems impossible that they should even know what to look for in
their search for it. Scott points out that,
Thus, in addition to knowing what to look for at the outset of the inquiry,Scottpointsout
the absurd notion of choosing one of many blanks as the object ofinquiry.lnotherwords,
Meno'sparadox does not simply raise the problem of where to start an inquiry into
something that is unknown, but raises the question of whether one even can recognize the
lack of knowledge to begin with. If Socrates and Meno really knewabsolutelynothing
aboutvirtuethentheywouldnotbeabletorecognizethefactthat they were lacking said
knowledge, since they would not even know that there was something called virtue that
they did not know. Furthennore,withregardtothethirdquestionoftheparadox,ifthey
do not already know the nature of virtue then they should not even recognize it once they
found it. This is a real problem for Plato's epistemology: if we aiready know the nature of
virtue, then the dialogues are unnecessary, since we would not have to search for the
definition but already have it at the ready. However, if we do notalready know the nature
of virtue then it follows that we could never find it, since we would not know what to
look for in the definition, nor would we know the definition to be true even were we to
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Meno'sparadox provides us with the philosophical problem of how to begin an
inquiry into the nature of an object if we do not already haveknowledge of that object.
The paradox is very much a eulmination of the problem of induction and deduction, and
therefore of the problem of the one and the many. As we have seen in both the Laches
and the beginning of the Meno induction and deduction fail as methods for defining the
virtues. It is their failures with which Menochallenges Socrates. Where both the
inductive and deductive methods assume that the answer being sought is unknown they
fall prey to Meno's first claim, that beginning an inquiry intoanunknownthingis
pointless in that the inquirer would neither know what it was he was looking for, and
therefore how to even look for it, nor eQuid he recognize theanswereven were it found
The altemative to not knowing the answer being sought renders both induction and
deduction (and inquiry in general) moot, as it is unnecessary to searchforananswerthat
is already known
However, there isasense in which we do already understand the natureofvirtuc.
The courts tend to do a relatively good job of honoring the just and punishing the unjust.
Laches too seems to have little trouble pointing out that Socrates was quite a courageous
soldier, or even act as one himself, and thus he must, at some level, implicitly know the
natureofcQurage. The people participating in the discllssionswithSocratestooseemto
realize when a definition that is not virtue or courage is proposed. They have no problem
recognizingSocrates'movestoshowwhyaproposeddefinitionisinadequate.
goodenoughforthetypeofinquirythatSocratesisproposing,itisnonethelessa
definition of courage and not, say, of justice or chair. What I meanto express with this
point is that Laches does have some implicit knowledge of the natureofcourage, since if
he did not he would not be able to give a definition of it at all. Thus, the first rhetorical
question of Meno's paradox must be fallacious; there isa sense in which Socrates, or any
inquirer for that matter, implicitly has knowledge of the object of inquiry. If this were not
the case and we had absolutely no knowledge at all, which Meno's first objection rests
upon, then Laches should not be able to point to an instanceofcourage or follow why a
proposed definition does not successfully define courage. However,while Laches does
somehow possess implicit knowledge of courage he does not have it in a way that can be
expressed linguistically, he does not possess the explicit knowledge. While he can point
to an instance ofa CQUrageolls action or give an example OfSllCh an instance (or even
provideanexampleofanon-courageousact},hecannotdefinecourage itself. Laches
both has and does not have the required knowledge of courage.
After Meno proposes his paradox he asks Socrates ifhe thinks it isa good
argument to which Socrates simply replies, "no.,,70 In order to explain why the argument
is not a good one, Socrates tells Menoamyth about the immortality of the soul and its
rebirth upon the death of the body. He explains
"lbid.,Sla
Thus, Plato suggests that the soul knows everything that there is to know, and when we
access that knowledge in a way that brings it directly to mind,we have not learned the
knowledge for the first time but instead have recollected itthroughthe soul. The doctrine
of recollection is an attempt by Plato to answer Meno's paradox, and thus it seeks to
express how inquiry can begin. It isimpoTtanthere for us to consider that what Plato is
suggesting is not necessarily an argument for the immortalityofthe soul,nordoes the rest
ofthedia!oguereston,orargue,thec!aimthatthesoulisimmortal.lnsteadofan
argument about the immortality of the soul,or a proof of the valid ity of recollection, the
l\4enoisademonstrationoftherecollectiveprocess.72 AsFindlaysuggests: "the doctrine
of[recollection]hereconsideredisofcQufsernythicinitsreferenee to an anterior life: all
that the argument needs is the ability to rise from the instancetothe generalized meaning,
which is involved even in the Socratictreatmentofdialectic.,,73 The slave boy example,
which we shall soon examine, is not proof of recollection but instead a model of how it
works. Socrates having, for once, the answer to an inquiry, hereageometricalproof,and
is able to check the boy's progress as a test to see if recollection, as a method of acquiring
knowledge works.
Thus, Plato argues that we do somehow have some knowledge of the nature of
virtue even before we begin our search, and that when we learn something new we are in
fact actually recalling it and we can, from that, recollect orconnectotherideas.The
doctrine of recollection expresses how we can have the knowledge of virtue, such that we
can distinguish the virtuous from the non-virtuous, yet still have no actual knowledge of
what the definition of virtue is. Thus, since the doctrine of recoilection is Plato's response
to Meno's paradox, and Meno's paradox is an articulation of the probiem of induction
anddeduction(andtherebyoftheproblemofoneandmany),Platoisalso replying to
these problems as well. Therefore, with the doctrine of recollection, we find Plato's way
forward beyond the problems of induction and deduction. Thus, the doctrine of
recollection is both the beginningandtheend,dialecticaIlY,ofPlato'sepistemology.That
is to say, it provides a starting point from which to begin inquiry, the fact that the
knowledge is already somehow present to us, and it provides a possibilityforitsend,the
actual recollection of the knowledge, in the case of the Meno a definitionofvirtue.
According to this theory we begin already with some sort of pre-existent knowledge when
we attempt to discern the nature of any object of inquiry. Since we somehow have an
idea, we can avoid the first issue of Meno's paradox, namely,howta begin an inquiry if
we do not already know what it is that we are looking for. Somehow we do already have
the knowledge. Thus, we can see how Laches can recognize a courageous act and not
confuse courage with justice or chair.
However, what Plato is not saying here is that we already have the knowledge
ready at hand and thus already know our object of inquiry. This ciaimwould fall victim to
the second part of Meno's paradox: if we already know what we are looking for then we
must already posses the knowledge, thus rendering inquiry unnecessary, This idea is
perhaps best expressed by way of analogy. Think of the acquisition of knowledge as an
act of navigation. Given that a person has a starting position, byknowingtheirown
position, it would be possible for them to navigate to another 10cation that is unknown to
them. However, in order for the person to successfully accomplishthistaskhewould
need to both have and know how to properly operate the correct tools,amapand
compass, and would have to have multiple points of reference, eitherconstant, such as the
North Star, or not constant, such as landmarks, such as trees, amountain ora lake. By
properly using the tools along with the reference points the person could then navigate his
way from his starting position to a new, previously unknown, position. This is similar to
the act of recollecting justice from the preexisting knowledge that we possess. Thus, by
using this analogy we can see how recollection avoids the problemsofMeno'sparadox
Recollection gives us a starting point from which to begin our inquiry. Wedoalready
somehow posses the capacity for knowledge, which is represented by the navigational
starting point. And yet, while we do have the capacity to begin our inquiry, our journey
toward knowledge, the knmyledge we seek is not immediately present to us in an explicit
way and so we must work to discover it, as one would work to plot an unknown point on
a map. Where the tools used in the navigational process are a map and compass, the tools
used in theepistemic process are language and discursive reasoning, and the proper
method for using these tools, according to Plato, is dialectic. In much the same way as the
dialectical process involves two or more members, the act ofnavigation requires at least
two points other then the unknown point the navigator is attemptingto ploL These points,
Likewise, the more members that are active in the dialectic process the more positions are
available to assist in the acquisition of explicit knowledge. 74 The navigational constant in
this analogy, the Norlh Star, would represent the form of the objectofinquire, in other
words the actual object itself. It can be used to guide us in the correctdirectionbut,justas
a person could never actually reach the North Star with a map and compass, we can never
fully grasp the form of the object." Recollection then, is the process whereby we navigate
from a known position, implicit knowledge, to an unknown position, explicit knowledge,
through the proper use of language and demonstration as tools as weII as the opinions of
others as navigational points
To think of recollection as an act of the memory, such as remembering where one
left his car keys, the face of an old friend,orhiscomputer'spassword, is to make a
critical mistake. This is perhaps best illustrated in Plato's Theaetetuswhere Socrates and
Theaetetusdebate whether knowledge is like birds that are caught in a cage that
represents the mind. Socrates suggests, "that every mindcontainsakind of aviary stocked
with birds of every sort [... ] and take the birds to stand for pieces 0 fknowledge.,,76 Thus,
possessing knowledge is akin to having the birds captured within the aviary, and recalling
theknowledgeisakintoreachinginandgrabbingthem.lnaddition to having to grab the
birds, there are many different kinds of birds within the cage anditispossiblethatone
may reach in and grab the incorrect one. Just asan ignorant person might mistake a dove
for a pigeon, it is possible that one may mistake knowledge of one subjectforknowledge
of another, for example eleven for twelve to borrow Socrates' example.77 While this
analogy seems to illustrate the type of process that Plato isdescribing when he speaks of
recollection, it actually does not. As Socrates and Theaetetus continuetheirdiscussion
they realize that, given the aviary example, they "were wrong in making the birds stand
for pieces of knowledge only, and [they] ought to have imaginedpiecesofignorance
flying about with them in the mind," since it is possible to mistake a false opinion for
actual knowledge ofa subject, such as Meno falsely believing his original definition of
virtue to be correct.78 Thus, ifone were to grasp a bird that represented ignorance, then he
would not know that he had done so, and would instead mistake it for the correct bird he
was reaching for (since, ifhe recognized the bird as ignorancethen he would most
certainly not make the mistake of grabbing it in the first place). However, if this is the
case then we are once again faced with Meno's Paradox since, ifthe person grabbing the
bird already knows which bird to grab,then the process of figuring out which one to grab




he grabbed the incorrect one. Thus, as Socrates and Theaetetus realize, knowledge is not
like birds in a cage, and one cannot simply grasp itas ifit were Iikebirds.
Plato provides an example of the recollective process in the Meno when Socrates
walks one of Meno's slaves though a geometrical proof. He begins by drawing a square in
the sand at his feet with a length and width of two, and asks the boy ifhe recognizes the
figure and ifhe understands the properties of such a figure. Once Socratcs is satisfied that
the boy understands the propertiesofa square, he asks him to provide the length and
width ofa square with double the area of the first square, to which the boy replies "it will
be double, Socrates,obviously.,,79 Socrates then proceeds to drawasquarewithfourby
four dimensions and asks the boy to tell him the area. Immediately the boy sees his
mistake and realizes that the new square does not have twicethearea of the first but
instead exceeds it by four times. The boy attempts to rectify hiserrorbysuggestingthat
the square with double the area of the first must then have a length and width of three,
given that the dimensions of the original were two by two and the square that was four by
four was too large. Again his error is displayed through the use of a diagram and
afterward the boy exclaims that he does not know the answer to Socrates'challenge.ln
response, Socrates turns his attention back to Meno
79Plato,Meno,82e.
8o lbid.,84a.
Socrates continues, and even Meno agrees that the boy is ina better position now having
learned that what he thought was correct was in fact not, even if he did not learn the
actual truth. Again, Socrates here shows himself to be like the sting ray by "paralyzing"
the boy, that is, showing him his own ignorance. This will be a key issue for us later when
we examine the dialectical structure of the recollective process. It is also worthwhile to
point out here that at various points throughout the demonstration,Socratesstopsto
ensure with Meno that the answers are coming from the boy and not being provided by
himself. Socrates is not dictating the answers to the boy, but instead is assisting the boy in
reaching the conclusions on his own. This too has great significanee in the dialectical
structureofrecollection,andassuch,wewillretumtobothofthese points in the Fourth
Chapter.
ignorance. In otherwords, the realization that one is lost is the firststepinthatperson
becoming un-lost. 82 Thus, with his new understanding that his prior opinions were false,
the boy is now free to actually learn (or rather recollect) somethingnew.Muchlikea
navigatorchartinganewcourse,Socratestoostartsbyerasingthe previousiy drawn
diagrams and draws the original two by two square. He proceeds to attachthreeother
squares of the same size to the original square making a larger fourbyfoursquarethatis
divided into four equal sections. By drawing a diagonal line that divides each of these
squaresinhaif,Socratescreatesanewsquareinthecenterofthepreviousone.Byasking
the boy various questions about the properties of diagonals and the size of the area of
each square that is enclosed by the new square the boy is lead to realizethat the new
square has double the area of the original two by two square, making it the square that
they had set out to find from the beginning. Again Socratesisexplicit in pointing out that
he did not provide the positions agreed to by the boy, but instead merely asked him
questions that lead to the boy realizing these opinions himself. However, what is perhaps
most telling from this model of recollection is that while Socrates does not provide the
answers for the boy, his participation in the demonstration is paramount. That isto say,
while Socrates certainly does not tell the boy the answers, he does engagewithhimina
method of question and answer which assists the boy in arriving at the correct answer to
the problem. Thus, as we shall soon see, the process of recollection isdialecticalin
The similar structure of the Laches and the beginning of the Meno is due to
Plato's attempt to express the problems of induction and deduction, specifically their
failures to define the virtues. Where the Laches ends in aporia, the Menocontinueswhen
Menochallenges Socrates to explain how inquiry is possible or necessary.Meno's
paradox is the culmination of the problems of induction and deduction.lfaperson
rnaking an inquiry does not know the answer to that inquiry, anassumptionofboththe
inductive and deductive methods, Meno asks how it would bepossible to begin an inquiry
into that thing or how it could ever be recognized were it found. Thus, he argues that
inquiry itself is a pointless endeavor, since if the inquirer lacksthe knowledge that he is
searchingforthenheshouldneverbeabletoacquireit.Altematively, if the inquirer has
the knowledge at the outset of their search then the inquiry isunnecessary, since the
inquirer already possess the knowledge and would not need to searchforit.Thusthe
failures of the inductive and deductive methods culminate in Meno's paradox, which aims
to show that they are either pointless or unnecessary.
Thus,Plato'sresponsetoMeno'sparadox,thedoctrineofrecollection,is,intum,
a response to the problems of induction and deduction. Furthermore, since, as we saw in
Chapter One, the problems of induction and deduction are tied closely to the problem of
While the knowledge is not present in any effable manner it is present in away that
allows us to recognize instances of it and begin an inquiry into theobject's true nature.
Thus, the doctrine of recollection avoids the issues raised by Meno's paradox: we have
the knowledge in such a way that inquiry can begin and that we can recognizetheobject
if we come across it, but we do not posses the knowledge in such as way that makes the
inquiry itself unnecessary. And, as we have seen with the slave boy and will further
discuss in Chapter Four, it is through an acceptance of our ignoranee and a willingness to
engage with others that recollection and new understanding can takeplace.
Chapter 4
The discussion in Chapters One and Two revolved around the problem 0 ftheone
and the many, its relation to the problems of induction and deduction and the manner in
which Plato addresses these issues in his philosophy. ChapterThreeexaminedthe
culmination of these problems in Meno'sparadoxand Plato'sresponse in the doctrine of
recollection. This final Chapter will examine the relationship between recollection and
dialectic. By re-examining the slave boy example as a controlled demonstrationofthe
recollectiveprocess I will show the means by whichrecollectionispossiblethrough
dialectical leaming. Recollection is Plato's way forward inresponsetoMeno'sparadox,
anddialecticisthemeansthroughwhichrecollectionispossible, the type of philosophy
that must be employed in order to overcome the problems associated with Meno's
paradox.ThisChapterwillexamineSocratcs'roleasamidwifeintherecollective
process, helping to bring forth new ideas from his counterpart's implicit knowledge.
Through his role as a mediator, Socrates aids others in birthing new ideas. Furthermore, I
will examine dialectical teaching as opposed to what I will refer to as implantation from
without: teaching where one person professes opinions to anotherwithouteitherperson
examining or challenging those opinions. Finally, I will address how recollection through
dialecticalleamingcircumventstheproblemofaporia,thefactthat Plato's dialogues
often end with the characters in a state of bafflement without havingansweredthe
questions that were posed at the beginning
Recollection is an act that requires both a having and a not having. While the slave
boy grasps the basic geometrical principals that Socrates asks of him, he cannot answer
thequestionofthedimensionsofthedoublesizedsquare.l-ledoes have some implicit
knowledge of geometry, enough to recognize the object Socratesdraws as a square and
therefore enough knowledge to begin the inquiry, but hedoesnothave the explicit
knowledge needed to answer Socrates' question. However, the pointofthisexerciseisto
show that while the boy does not have the knowledge to answerSocrates'inquiryatthe
bcginning of the discussion, he does, intheend,answerthatvery inquiry on his own,
without Socrates, or anyone else, providing him with the answer. The boy seemingly goes
from not knowing the dimensions of the square with twice the area of the original to
being able to recognize the corrcct answer without anyone telling him what it is. Thus,
since the knowledge did not come from an outside source, it must have come fTom
himself, he must have already somehow known it implicitly. However, while Socrates
does not provide any answers to the boy a!ong the path to the final answertheyare
looking for, he does indeed help him along by leading him in the correctdirection.This
notion of aiding another through the use of language anddemonstration is paramount in
thc rccollective processand,as we shall see throughout this Chapter,itisdialectical.
The notion that recollection requires both a having and a not having is paramount
for the dialectic process. The model of the slave boy moving from implicit knowledge, a
having, of the geometrical proof to explicit knowledge of it isonlypossiblebecausethere
is also a not having: the fact that at the beginning of the example the boy did not know the
answer. Returning to Meno's paradox, we can see how the having (hexis, literally
meaningcapacity),the boy's implicit knowlcdgc, allows the inquiry to begin, since this
knowledge gives the inquiry a possible starting point. As we have seen in Chapter Three,
thisimplicitknowledgeallowslhoseengagingininquirytocircumventoneofthe
problems associated with Meno's paradox, namely, how it is possible to conduct an
inquiry into something that is unknown to the inquirer because the object of inquiry is not
totally unknown to the inquirer and therefore can be recognized iffound.Whilethis
implicit knowledge shows that inquiry is not pointJess, the boy's lack of explicit
knowlcdge,thereasonhecannotanswerSocrates'question,iswhat makes inquiry
necessary, thereby circumventing the opposing problem ofMeno'sparadox: why inquiry
into somcthing that is known would ever be necessary. Dialectic is the activity that allows
the boy to recollect and can only begin when he is able to recognize his own ignorance.
This ignorance is necessary for explicit knowledge to be formed or realized. The slave
boycouldnotmoveforwardinhispathtoansweringSocrates'inquiry until he realized
that he was not able to provide the necessary answer and what he had originally thought
was knowledge was in facta false opinion. His realization of hisownignorance,that
there was a gap in his knowledge, was what allowed him to challenge his own opinions
and move forwardepistemically. This notion of the gap is paramount to thc dialectic, and
thereby recollective, processes.
RetumingtoPlato'sSevenlhLelter,thisgapcanheexpresscdasthe separation
between the fourth and fifth classes of objects, knowledge about an object and the real
object itself. The fact that we have implicit knowledge is what allows us to move past the
problem of how to begin inquiry proposed by Meno's paradox. This implicit knowledge,
represented by the fourth class of objects, is the having with regard to recollection, or, to
refer again to our navigation analogy, this class would represent the ability or capacity to
navigate or plot the proper course to the unknown point by havingaknown starting point,
one's own position. Alternatively, the factthatwedonothavetheknowledgeinaway
that is expressible linguistically at the outset of inquiry iswhat makes that inquiry
represent the unknown point that we are trying to plot and the fact that we do not already
know the correct path to that point, so therefore must engage in the act of navigation. The
gap would be the literal separationofnavigatorandnavigationaI end point and the very
process of navigating to iL Much like the navigator plots and moves from his starting
position through a newly plotted coursetoa previously unknown destination,the
dialectician moves from a previously known point, implicit knowledge, through a newly
established course of discussion and argument, dialectic, towarda previously unknown
idea, explicit knowledge. In both cases there is also a need ofreferencepoints;forthe
navigatortheotherknownpointsonthemapusedtoproperlytriangu late the unknown
position, and for the dialectician the opinions of others llsed to assist in the triangulation
of knowledge. The gap is the space where this explicit knowledge can be recollected,the
space between the knowing and not knowing, the fourth and fifth cIassesofobjects,
where we can move past the problems presented by Meno's paradox and engage in
inquiry.83 The fourth class of objects gives us the start point, whilethefifthclassof
objects gives us our guide toward the eventual end point, and the gap represents the
necessity of the journey itselfand the space in which we find our endpoint.Language
and demonstration represent thc tools that we use to navigatc, our map and compass. With
regard to the Seventh Leller these tools would be the first three classes of objects: names,
descriptions, and images, and, coupled with the fourth class, the implicit knowledge about
the object of inquiry, our starting point, they can guide us to the explicitknowledgethat
we seek. As Plato explains, "if [...] a man does not somehow or other gct hold of the first
four,hewillnevergainacompleteunderstandingofthefifth.,,84
Thus, retuming to the model of the slave boy example, we see the havinginthe
boy's implicit knowledge about geometry at the beginning of the model, the not having in
his inability to answer Socrates' inquiry at the beginning ofthedemonstration, and the
gapinhisrealizationofhisownignorancethatallowshimtorecollect the absent
knowledge. This realization of ignorance, the gap, is what allows the activity of dialectic
to occur. By using the first four classes of objects: names,descriptions,imagesandthe
boy's implicit knowledge of geometry, Socrates is able to assistthe boy in recollecting
the knowledge of the corrcct answer without simply dictating it to him. Socrates starts
with the name of the subject of inquiry, square, and describes its properties using the
images he draws in the sand. By drawing new images and describing them Socrates is
able to assist the boy in moving from not knowing the area of the square twice the size of
the original to gasping that knowledge by the end of the example. However, without
Socrates' assistance the boy would have assumed his original answer, that the square with
twice the area of the original two by two square had dimensions of four by four, was
correct. 8S Itisthroughtheboy'sacceptanceofhisignorance,hiswillingness to accept
that he did not posses the explicit knowledge that he thought that hehad,thatheisableto
84 Plato, Seventh Letter, 342d.
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move forward in the example and eventually recollect the correct answer. The example of
the slave boy is contrasted by Meno who, while clearly more educated than the slave boy,
cannot move forward to learn something new for himself because he assumes that he
already knows the answers to Socrates' questions. Take, for exampie, Meno'sassumption
that he knows the nature of virtue at the beginning of the dialogue andhisastonishment
that Socrates claims ignorance on the matter. When Socrates shows Meno that he in fact
does not have knowledge of virtue, instead of accepting his own ignorance Meno tries to
shutinquiryitselfdownbyproposinghisparadox.ltisonlyatlerMeno realizes his own
limitations that he too can move forward and learn something new, that inquiry is indeed
possible and necessary. Hisadmissionat84bthattheslaveboyisina better position
having had his falseopinionsaboutthegeometTical proofdestroyedandreplacedby
ignorance on the matter, as well as his acceptance of the process ofrecollectionat 85c,
show that Meno is capable of dialectical engagemcnt. Boththesepassagesindicatethat
Meno has progressed in his understanding of inquiry by witnessing the model of
recollection demonstrated by Socrates with the slave boy.
As we noted earlier in Chapter Three, it is important for us to remember here that
the slave boy example is just that, an example, a model orcontrolled demonstration of the
process of recollection. The example works asa model,because Socrates and Meno
already know the answer to the geometrical questionproposedtothe slave boy so they
can check his answers along the way. However, with regard to recoilection and dialectical
learning of the nature of the virtues, the subject of inquiry about which Plato proposes to
use this method, the participants do notcxplicitly have the answers that they seek, since if
they did then the inquiry would be unnecessary, as Meno's paradox has indicated." The
beginningofdialecticalteachingrequiresthatallpartiesinvolvedcome together with an
understanding that they all lack the explicit knowledge they are seeking and through the
through the medium of language and demonstration they can attempt to aid one another in
reaching this knowledge. This type of teaching is contrasted wi thimplantationfrom
without. the process whereby one person professes his opinions to another. Plato's fear is
that if this type of teacher's opinions are incorrect, then there is the chance that the
sludentswhoarelisteningtotheteacherareindangerofadoptingthesame,false,
Sophisticopinions.AswehaveseenwithSocrates,Platociearlybelievesthatan
understanding of one's ignorance is much more preferable to the beliefinanuntrue
opinion. Thus, with the dialectical process each member of the act ivity has already an
understanding that he does not know the answer to what is being sought, that he lacks the
explicit knowledge that they seek. Since no member of the group assumes to know the
answer, each opinion proposed can be properiy scrutinized andexami ned for any tlaws,
making it much less likely that the activity will result in the dialecticians believing ina
false opinion. With regard to our navigation anaiogy, the use of implication from without
would be akin to someone walking into the woods and assuming that he knew the correct
path to where they wanted to go and ignoring the landmarks around them. This isa very
dangerous action, both navigationally anddiaiectically since in both cases it is possible to
get lost. Further, without the proper landmarks to aid one in orient ing himself it can be
verydifficulttoevenrealizethatheislost.87
The second important distinction between dialectic and implantation from without
is that dialectic is a process of teaching whereby each dialectician must move through the
correct path to the answer, while the teacher using implantation from without simply
states an opinion without necessarily working through the processofhow it was arrived
at. As Socrates explains to Meno during the slave boy demonstration, "watch how [the
boy] recollects things in order-the proper way to recollect.,,88 This process is important
for several reasons. First of all it allows the dialecticians the opportunity to see an error in
the movement toward their answer. Second, it allows the dialectician to learn something
more about things other than simply the subject of inquiry. For example, in refining a
definitionandrefutingfalseopinionsaboutcQurage,theinteriocutorsin the Laches learn
what things are not couragc during their discussion. The failed defin it ions proposed
throughout the dialogue serve to teach each member of the inquiry that while something
such as staying at one's post and not fleeing may be a courageous act ,itisnotthe
definition of courage itself. This point is also evident in theslave boy example since the
boy not only discovers the dimensions of the square with an area twice as big as the first
but also "Ieams the areas of the four-foot and three-footsquares.Theseareclaimswe
would not attribute to the boy at the beginning of the interrogation; had he been familiar
with the areas of these squares, he would not have forwarded them assolutions:,89
The third important thing that dialeclic offers that implantation from withoul does
not is that teaching through a process, and not simply through professing an opinion,
offers the dialectician an opportunity 10 see the process behind theanswer:thereason
whyaparticularanswcristhebestanswer.Thisisanalogicaltoso!vinganalgebraic
equation such as x-2=3. \Vhile someone teaching through implantation from without may
teJl you correctly that the answcr is 5, dialectic gives you the reason why the answer is 5
(x-2=3, x~3+2, x=5). Thus, when presented with a different yet similar problem, say
x+3~10,thestudentwholeamsviadialectichasadistinctadvantagein that he
understandstheunderiyingmathematicalprinciplesatplay.AsHeinarnansuggests
The dialectical method, because it is a process of moving frorn ignorance to explicit
knowledge that each member orthe process must go though, can uncover important
principles behind the answer that is being sought. Relurning again to the slave boy
example, it would have been easy for Socrates 10 simply tell the slaveboytheanswerto
thegeomelricalproof,skippingtheprocessofworkingthroughitaltogelher.However,
89 Franklin, Lee. "Meno's Paradox, the Slave-Boy Inlerrogation,and the Unity of Platonic
Recollection", The SourhernJollmal ofPhilosophy. 47. (2009): 349-77,363
90 Heinaman, Robert. "Plato: Metaphysics and Epistemology". Rourledge History of
Philosophy 1'0/.1: From the Beginning to Plato. Ed.Taylor,C.C.W.. ewYork:
Roulledge,1997,376
the benefit of Socrates working through the proofwilh the boy is thatthe boy is able to
sec the places where he errs as well as the process of how the correct answer is arrived at
If Socrates simply dictated the answer to the boy instead of working through the proof,
then when faced with another geometrical problem the boy would not have any method at
hand to attempt to solve it. In relation to the navigation analogy this would be the
difference between Socrates simply telling the boy which way to go and him showing the
boy how to properly useamapandcompass to find the correct path himself. It is by
working through the problem with Socrates' aid that the boy is able to grasp not only the
correct answer to the question but also the proper method to use in order to get that
answer. While it may seem like Socrates has to go through more work to tcach the boy
usingdia!cctic, this method provides its advantages, espccialIywhen it comes to further
passing on knowledge. While the student who learns via implantation from without can
passon the answer to the inquiry only in a repetitive way, that ishy repeating the answer
that was told to him, the student of dialectic is able to also pass 0 n the reason why that
particu)ar answer is the best one. In other words, the student ofdialectic is able to
recollcct knowledge with thc assistance ofthc othcr members of the dialecticalactivityas
well as assist others to recollect that knowledge as wcll. Thisabilityto beablc to passon
9'Franklin,363.
knowledgecorrectlyandelfectively is very important for Plato as we see in the beginning
of the Laches."
Within the dialectical process, opinion expressed through language and
demonstration are mediators; they allow the activity of dialect ic to take place and
recollection to occur. As we have seen, with regard to theSevenlh Letter language and
demonstration can be represented by Plato's first three classes 0 fobjects:names,
descriptions, and images. They serve as mediators sincc they are the tools that allow the
dialectician to move between the having and not havingofrecollection. That is, they
allow the participants of the process of dialectic to recolleclthe explicil knowledge that
they seek. Through the interplay of two or more individuals, each member of the process
puts forth what he believes to be a true opinion foreachofthemembers to consider.
Through these expressions and the scrutiny of them, dialecticiansattempt to move closer
torecollectingtheknowledgeofthesubjectoftheirinquiry.lfrecollection is the process
of navigating from a known to an unknown point then the process wherebythatpointis
plottcdisdialectic,andwherethenavigatoruscsamapandcornpasstodohisplottingthe
dialectician uses opinion expressed linguistically or through demonstration.93 Language
and demonstration a!so serve as mediating factors between individual people; they spur
the dialectician to bridge the gap between knowing and not knowi ng,torecollect,and
also allow him to motivate the next person to do the same. With regard to navigation
these people represent the other points that help the navigator triangulate the correct
position to properly plot the course, the landmarks along the path.
This ability to motivate the other to recollect knowledge forhimselfisSocrates'
role as a dialectician. While in the Apology he claims to knownothing,Socratesdoes
possesatleastonetechne,dialectic.94 Thisfactcanbeclearly seen in Plato's Theaetetus
where Socrates is described as a midwife, a caregiver who helps with the delivery of a
newborn child. While in a discussion about what nature of knowledge is, Theaetetus says
to Socrates that although he has often mused over the question he has never found an
adequate answer, and yet he cannot get the question out of his rnind. Socrates replies,
"that is because your mind is not empty or barren. You are suffering the pains of
travail"." What Socrates is saying here is that Theaetetus is goi ngthrough the pains of
labor, of childbirth. He continues and informs his partner that his mother was a midwife
and that he also practices the same art. However, while Socrates' mother no doubt
practiced the art of midwifery with physical children, her son is practiced at doing so with
Theaetetus' arguments. Socrates replies to the charge:
94 Plato, Theaetetlls, 21
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So then, like the midwife, Socrates is helping to produce something that belongs to
someone else. His skill is only to work with the person in order to heIp him produce it.
Plato'smetaphorofSocratesasamidwifeisdirectlyrelatedtothe dialectical
methodandthereforetotheprocessofrecollection.lnthedialectical method there is
always a need of a second party, another person who serves as a mediator of ideas. As we
have seen, the process begins with one person making a claim and then the other
attemptingtorefutcthisclaimwithasmuchvigoraspossibleinordertotestitsstrength
Through this method the dialecticians hope constantly to refine the opinions expressed by
both parties until what is being sought is discovered. Bothparties work together to
navigate until the correct point is plotted. It is imperative that the knowledge that both
parties are seeking takes precedence over either member of the process, as Socrates
expresses in the Phaedo·
Much as the midwife is charged with the care of the health of the chiId during and after its
birth,thedialecticianmusttoocare for the newly formed idea;he must nurture it and put
its health above all else.98 Hawever, lhe manner in which the dialectician does this differs
considerably from the method by which the midwife cares for the child. While the child
must be protected and coddled the newly formed idea must be attackedasfiercelyas
possible as to test it and ensure itisnota fa!seidea
Much like the child that comes from the mother, the idea too comes from a
member of the dialectical process. The analogy of childbirth helpstoexplainhow
recollection can circumvent the problems presented by Meno'sparadoxofhowitis
possible to begin an inquiry into something that is unknown and whyitisnecessaryifthe
knowledge is already present. Thus, with these problems in mind, it is important to notc
that while the knowledge is already present within the dialecticianitisnot fully formed,
that is, it is only present implicitly. Much as the child is undeveloped and not fully formed
as it lives inside its mother, the idea too is present but not fully developed. It is the
moment of birth that forever changes the child. In that single moment the child becomes
something new; it is brought into the world and for the first time exists apart from its
mother. And while the child becomes something very different and new at the moment it
that is then challenged and refined.99 It is in this process that the gap between knowing
and not knowing, which we discussed earlier, can be filled. The dialectician begins with
the implicit knowledge that provides the starting point of inquiry andby using language
and demonstration has the possibility to discover something that was absent at the outset
of the discussion, namely, explicit knowledge
This is what Socrates attempts with the slave boy example in the Meno. Though
the dialectical process, aided by Socrates as the midwife, the slave boy moves from
implicit knowledge, which allows the inquiry to begin, toa realizationofhisignorance
and then finally to explicit knowledge about the subject at hand. As we noted earlier,
Socrates in no way gives the boy the answers which he seeks, he simply aids the boy 10
realize,torecollect,theexplicitknowledgehimself.WilhoutSocrates'helptheboy
would have gone on assuming that his false opinion about the answer to the question was
actually knowledge. It is only through Socrates "stinging" the boy,touseMeno's
terminology, that he can realize his ignorance and enter intotheprocessofrccollecting
the correct answer to the inquiry. Furthcr,Socratesaidstheboyin shaping his answer by
guiding him in the necded directions, in cffectguiding him tonavigatethe proper path to
knowledge while nol aClually doinglhe navigating himself. Each Iime the boy realizes
thattheopinionhehasexpressedisnotthecorrectoncitisasifhe further narrows or
defines thccorrect path
While this method seems to work quile well with the model of the slave boy and
the geometrical proof, what Plato is really interested in isdefiningthevirtues.Aswehave
seen, the issue with attempting to do lhis is that the definitions putfonharealwaystoo
narrow or to broad too be the virtue that they are describing. It is Plato's hope thaI by
using the dialectical method to recollect we may move past the inherent problems of
induction and deduction. This is possible since recollection is an activitythatbeginswith
a having and a not having and thus, circumvents the problems of Meno's paradox to
which induction and deduction fall prey.
However,noneofthedialoguesdiscussedhereendwithanysatisfactory
definitionofa virtue and it is often the case that the interlocutorsendupmoreconfused
then lhey were when the dialogue started. 100 This is oflen referred to as the problem of
aporia. There are two important considerations to make on this po int.Thelirstwe
discussed above: dialectic offers more than just the possibility 0 funderstandingthe
subject at hand. As we have seen, it can also illuminate other considerationsaboutthe
world and our place within it. Even had the slave boy not realized theeorrectdimensions
of the square, he would still have been better off than he was when he had started,
because he WQuid have realized his own ignorance and abandoned a falseopinion that he
incorrecliy thought to be knowledge. The second consideration moredirectlyaddresses
100 The Republic isa notable exception to this trend in Plato's early and middle dialogues
since Plato does give a rather convincing argument for Justice being each person doing
what they are best suited to do in hannony with the state. Foronefonnulationofthis
definition see Book IV 434c.
lheproblemofaporia: toexpeCl Plalo 10 definejuslice, courage or any oflhe other
virtues at the end of any of his dialogues would be 10 miss the point of those dialogues
entirely. Plato was not writing these works in order to dictate to his audience what the
natureoflhevirluesis.lndoingthalhewouldbesubscribingtotheverymelhodthalhe
believes to be fallaciolls and even dangerous, implantation from without. With this in
mind, il is my contenlion thaI Plato would wish us 10 challenge even his seemingly
satisfactory definition ofjustice in the Republic, to engage with it in a dialectical manner
and attempt to improve it even further. Dialectic is an act, a journey that people must
make forlhemselves. Aided as lhey are byolhers, lhey should not be told lhe answer 10
their inquiry but should be moved 10 work with others in order to realize thaI knowledge
for themselves. With this in mind it is my contention that there really is no problem of
aporia to speak of. The dialogues should not be read as diclating some sort oftrulh to us
bUl rather they express a means for acquiring knowledge forourse Ives. Through engaging
with the texts, and with one another about them, we can get a clear picture of what sort of
things the virtues eQuId be, and in doing SQ we have a very real opportunity to acquire
knowledge about them. Plato's fear is that the lines ofcommunication, of real argument,
will close, and one person will passively accept the opinions of another without
challenginghimlopushlhoseopinionstolheirlimits.1tisonlythrough engaging wilh
one another and pushing our dialectical partners to really challenge their opinions that we
can all move forwardepislemically. It is only through this type of discussionand
engagement with one another that we can be sure that the other person's opinions, or our
own, are true, Perhaps most importantly it isonly though understandingourown
ignorance and embracing it rather than avoiding it thaI we can hopeto bridge the gap
between knowing and not knowing and acquire new knowledge.
Plato's doctrine of recollection, as practiced through the process 0 fdialectic,ishis
answer to the problems inherent with the inductive and deductive methods and thereby,
due to their intrinsic connection, the problem of the one and the many expressed through
the Presocratic philosophers. Epistemically, the problem of the one and the many
expresses the problem of how it is possible to know particulars given that if we rely solely
onoursensestheworldappearsinastateofevershiftingflux,asmaintainedby
Heraclitus, and if we rely solely on reason then it follows that Be ingisonecontinuous,
unifiedprinciple,asexpressedbyParmenides. Where Heraclitus maintains that the world
is in a constant state of flux, the issue of how to understand particulars is based on our
ever-changing sensation of them. On the other hand, ifnon-beingisimpossible,as
Parmenidescontends,lhenitmusthavealwaysbeen,sinceitcould never have non been
Furthermore, if Being has always been then it must always continue to be and,since there
can be nothing outside of being, it rnustalso be one unified thing,thcrefore it must follow
that Being is one, continuous principle. The issue of how to understandparticularsinthis
case is that, given that Being is unified and continuous, it is unchanging and undivided
and therefore there could not be any perception of individual particulars that are separate
from Being itself. Thus, with Heraclitus we have an absolute individuation, a constant
tlux,andwith Parmenides we have an absolute unity, an eternal one. While both
philosophers approach the world from different directions itisclcarthat both theories
suffer from one common issue: how is it possible to account for the particular objects we
encounter every day?
Directly related to this problem are the issues inherent with the inductiveand
deductive methods. Where Heraclitus' flux expounds the problem of moving from
absolute individuation to one continuous object the inductive rnethod aims to move from
observations about a group of particulars toa universal claim about the set of those
particulars. In both cases sensedata is relied upon to move from anumber of experiences
to one thing and in both cases a problem arises in doing so. Aswehaveseen, with
Heraclitus the issue is synthesizing the many experiences of one thing into a single object,
whereas with the inductive method the problem arises in synthesizing many experiences
with one type of object into a claim about all objects of that type. In both cases there is an
attempt to unify multiple experiences intoa single thing with the use of limited sense
data. Parmenides' one, on theotherhand,isdirectlyrelatedtothe deductive method,
which attempts to take a universal claim and attributed it to a particular member of a set.
The issue in both cases is in taking a singular principle, in Parmenides' case the one and
in deductions' case a universal claim, and attempting to pluralize it.
suggestions in attempting to discover the nature of the virtues and define them. What is
soon discovered is that language is either too specific, when the definitions proposed are
arrived at inductively, or too broad,whenthedelinitions proposed are arrived at
deductively. The goal isto find a definition that is neither too specific, as to not account
which is the culmination of the above problems, Plato offers his famous doctrine of
recollection, which explores the possibility that the knowledge we seek is somehow
already present within us even ifit is not always present to us
Recollection then isa process of both having and not having. We begin inquiry
already possessingknowlcdge implicitly and thought the act of dialectic atlempt to
achieve knowledge in an explicit way. This implicit knowledge is not within us like birds
in a cage or like coins in a pocket but instead as a starting point on a journey toward
knowledge. While the possibility of acquiring that knowledge is thcre, since we begin
with this starting point, we must engage with one another dialectically in order to
properly navigate to the knowledge. While a navigator uses a map and compass as tools,
the dialectician navigatcstQward knowledge using language and argument.
dialectic and recollective process was to create a method ofeducation that accepted
ignorance and used it as a tool and not a flaw. The benefit of such a process is that in
assuming our ignorance and not knowledge we stand a much bcttcrchanceofnot
accepting a false opinion as actual knowledge and avoid the risk of passing on that false
opinion to another person so that they too may be prevented from beIieving what is false.
Bibliography
Primary Sources
Aristotle. The Basic Workso!Aristotle. Ed. Richard McKeon. NewYork:Modern
Library.200l.
Descartes, Rene.SelecledPhilosophical Wrilings.Trans. Cottingham,John.Stoothoff,
Robert. Murdoch, Dugald. New York: Cambridge UP. 1988.
Kirk, G. S., Raven, J. E. and Schofield. M. eds. The Presocratic Philosophers. Ncw York:
Cambridge UP. 2007
Plato. The Collecled Dialogues ofP/alo. Eds. Hamilton, Edith. Caims,Huntington
Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1961
Popper,KariR. The LogicofScienlijic Discovely. 1952. London: Routledge. 1992
Taylor, Thomas, and Floyer Sydenham, trans. The Works ofPlalo. Vol. 5. Frome:
Prometheus Project. 1996.
Secondary Sources
Day, Jane, ed. PlalO's Meno in Focus. New York: Routledge. 1994
Findlay,J. N. PlaloandPialonislIl: an Inlroduclion. New York: Times.1978.
Franklin, Lee. "Meno'sParadox, the Slave-Boy Interrogation, andtheUnityofPlatonic
Recollection." The Soulhern Journal ofPhilosophy. 47. 349-77.2009.
Graham, Curd, ed. The Oxford Handbook ofPresocralic Philosophy. New York: Oxford
Heinaman, Robert. "Plalo: Metaphysics and Epistemology". ROll/ledge History of
Philosophy vol. I: Froll//he Beginning /0 Pl%. Ed. Taylor, C. C. W.. New York:
Routledge. 1997.
Hussy, Edward. "Pythagoreansand Eleatics". RowledgeHis/oryofPhiiosophyvol.1
Frolll/heBeginningtoPlato.Ed.Taylor,C.C. W.. ewYork:Routledge.1997.
Scott, Dominic. Plato·s Meno. ew York: Cambridge UP. 2006.
Tarrant, Harold. Recollecting Pla/o's Meno. London: Duckworth Academic. 2004




